DEMOCRATIC TAX DESIGN UNDER LABOR MOBILITY: MECHANISM DESIGN, VOTING, AND FISCAL COMPETITION

Authors

  • Malika Sharipova Makhmudjon kizi Author

Keywords:

Mechanism Design, Asymmetric Information, Tax-Driven Migration, Endogenous Skill Distribution, Political Economy, Median Voter Equilibrium, Fiscal Externalities

Abstract

This article provides an analysis of tax schedules that are designed to be optimal for individual citizens. These tax schedules are created in a way that's best for the individual not for the overall good of society. We look at how people make decisions about where to live based on the tax rates in areas. We also examine how the government can create tax schedules that take into account the fact that people can move to areas

Author Biography

  • Malika Sharipova Makhmudjon kizi

    Assistant in the Department of Economics

    UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND PEDAGOGY

    Andijan region, Oltinkul district, Do‘stlik street 45

    e-mail: msharipova928@gmail.com

References

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Published

2026-06-26

Issue

Vol. 33 No. 1 (2026): Ta'limning zamonaviy transformatsiyasi

Section

Articles